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现代企业最优控制权安排的规范性解释 被引量:1

Formal Analysis on the Optimal Control Power Arrangement in Modern Firms
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摘要 本文在张维迎(1995)的基础上,建立现代企业的最优控制权安排模型。与张的结论相同,企业最优控制权安排取决于企业成员的相对重要性和相互监督的效力。现代企业中,企业成员的相对重要性取决于其拥有的人力资本和非人力资本的重要性,而监督的效力又依赖于人力资本的特质。因此,在现代企业中,让拥有人力资本的董事会或经理掌握企业的控制权是较优的安排。 This paper develop a model of optimal control power arrangement in modem firms on the basis of zhangweiying(1995)theory.Consistent to him,the optimal conntrol right arrangement depends on the importance of firm members and the effectiveness of inter-supervision.In firms,the importance of members depend on that of their human capital or physical capital,while the effectiveness of inter-supervision rely on the nature of human capital.Therefore,it is optimal to make board of directors or managers who have human capital had control power.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2004年第3期106-111,共6页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词 控制权 最优 人力资本 非人力资本 control power optimal human capital physical capital
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